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Between justice and politics: the role of the Spanish
Constitutional Court in the state of autonomies
Jean-Baptiste Harguindéguy a, Gonzalo Sola Rodríguezb and
José Cruz Díazc
ABSTRACT
This study focuses on the role of the Spanish Constitutional Court in the state of autonomies between 1980
and 2014. It questions the evolution of the court in two ﬁelds. First, it demonstrates that the court profoundly
shaped the contours of the devolution process through a dynamic of ‘judicialization’. Second, this research
analyzes the politicization process of constitutional justice by territorial actors. This dynamic led to the quasi-
paralysis of the court from 2008 to 2012 through the ruling of the reform of the Catalan statute. This paper
concludes the court can be best interpreted as a ‘trustee’ aspiring to remain an independent arbiter within a
framework lacking alternative fora for regulating intergovernmental relations.
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INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the decisions adopted by the Spanish Constitutional Court (Tribunal Constitucio-
nal) in the ﬁeld of centre–periphery relations have provoked signiﬁcant popular reactions –
especially in Catalonia. For instance, on 9 July 2010, thousands of people demonstrated in
Barcelona against the ruling of the court concerning the new statute of Catalonia (Lázaro,
2010). Those massive rallies demonstrated that the court was a central actor in the territorial
politics in Spain. However, they also indicated that a signiﬁcant part of the Catalan population
considered the court to be an institution driven by political interests that favour centralism.
Consequently, those two readings seem to contradict the ofﬁcial vision of the court as an impartial
guardian of the Constitution.
Drawing on the recent literature about the role(s) of constitutional courts in multilayered
countries, this paper addresses the question of what the current role of the Spanish Constitutional
Court is with respect to the ‘state of autonomies’ (Aroney & Kincaid, 2017). In order to address
this question, this paper focuses on the two constitutive dimensions of the court’s role (Ferejohn,
2002). On the one hand, the court can be considered as a policy-shaper of the laws adopted by the
executive and the legislature in the ﬁeld of territorial governance; this evolution is part of a process
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of judicialization of territorial politics. On the other hand, the role of the court must be understood
in the broader context of the political pressures exerted by state-wide political parties on judges,
that is, the dynamic of the politicization of constitutional justice.
The study of constitutional courts in federal and decentralized countries constitutes a conso-
lidated strand in the literature on comparative federalism. This issue has been explored extensively
in Germany through the study of the Federal Constitutional Court (Benz, 2017), in Australia with
the High Court (Chordia & Lynch, 2014), and in Canada (Schertzer, 2013) and the United States
with their respective supreme courts (Banks & Blakeman, 2012). In Spain, the nexus between the
Constitutional Court and territorial politics has caught the attention of public law specialists since
its creation (Alonso García, 1984; Borrajo Iniesta, 2004; García de Enterría, 1982), but it has been
relatively ignored by political scientists.
This literature gap has been partially ﬁlled by a set of recent studies. On the one hand, some
authors have focused on the drivers of the intergovernmental litigations handled by the court. Sala
(2010, 2014) demonstrated that regional and central governments modiﬁed their strategy of liti-
gation according to the composition of the court or their past successes in a given policy area. Sala
concluded that the central government was favoured by the rulings of the constitutional judges
when it tackled an area where it had won in the past, and when the justices were known for
their lack of regional sensibility (Sala, 2011). From a more institutionalist perspective,
Harguindéguy, Rodríguez, and Sánchez (2017) have shown the importance of parliamentarian
equilibriums for explaining the rise of intergovernmental conﬂicts before the Constitutional
Court.
On the other hand, some scholars have attempted to identify the variables explaining the
court’s decisions on a series of issues since the late 1980s (del Castillo, 1987). Drawing on agency
theory, Garoupa, Gómez-Pomar, and Grembi (2013) argued that the court’s preferences could be
framed neither as the pure application of the law nor as the simple result of pressures exerted by
political parties on the justices. Other elements such as peer pressure, the search for consensus and
the aim to increase the legitimacy of the court mattered in the decision-making process. In the
same vein, López Laborda, Ródrigo, and Sanz Arcega (2016) aimed to identify the drivers of
the Constitutional Court’s decisions on conﬂicts of competence opposing the Spanish central gov-
ernment and the autonomous communities. They concluded that the Constitutional Court was
not a simple instrument used by the central government against the Spanish regions.
All these studies have helped to shed a light on the evolution of constitutional justice in the
ﬁeld of territorial governance in Spain, but they also had some limitations. From a methodological
viewpoint, the quantitative treatment of centre–periphery litigations says little about the impor-
tance of some of them. For instance, the conﬂict over the 2006 regional statute of Catalonia
was far more relevant for territorial governance than the 2016 controversy concerning the compe-
tence over bullﬁghting shows. Consequently, a more qualitative and ﬁne-grained view is needed to
understand the ambivalent role of the court within the state of autonomies, and its importance in
the Spanish devolution process. The central hypothesis of this paper is that judicialization and
politicization affect all the constitutional courts operating in federal states; but in Spain those
dynamics have led to an institutional deadlock.
In order to provide such a perspective, this study was conducted from March 2015 to June
2016. First, it consisted of collecting the academic publications and ofﬁcial reports dealing with
the Constitutional Court in order to elaborate descriptive statistics about the main trends of con-
stitutional justice in Spain from 1980 to 2014. A series of 30 interviews were then undertaken with
civil servants (constitutional judges and members of the Ministry of Finance and Public Admin-
istration –Ministerio de Hacienda y Administraciones Públicas or MINHAP), politicians (at the
state and regional levels), and experts (academic experts and journalists). Those interviews lasted
between 40 and 60 min and focused on the role of the Constitutional Court, its problems of poli-
ticization, the impact of its rulings and the behaviour of political actors.
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The paper is structured as follows. The next section centres on the creation of the Consti-
tutional Court and its speciﬁc role within the Spanish quasi-federal system. The third and fourth
sections tackle the processes of judicialization and politicization of Spanish territorial politics.
Finally, the question of how federal issues affect the court is addressed in the conclusion.
THE RELEVANCE OF THE COURT FOR TERRITORIAL ISSUES
A Spanish adaptation of the Kelsenian model
After 40 years of Francoism, the rise of decentralization and the absence of a constitutional regu-
lation of this process quickly converted the Spanish Constitutional Court into a pivotal actor in
intergovernmental relations. Drawing on the Kelsenian tradition, Spanish constitutionalists
adopted a model of concentrated judicial review: the Tribunal represents the highest body in
the ﬁeld of constitutional law and it is independent from judicial power.1 It holds a monopoly
on the interpretation of the Constitution, and its decisions cannot be appealed. This court is
ruled by constitutional articles 159–165 and by the 3 October 1979 Organic Law (Ley Orgánica
del Tribunal Constitucional – LOTC) (Elvira Perales, 2013).
The Constitutional Court includes 12 justices. All must be experienced jurists. The justices are
elected for a single nine-year mandate, and four of them are replaced every three years. Four can-
didates are proposed by the Congress (by a majority of three-ﬁfths); four are proposed by the Sen-
ate (also by a majority of three-ﬁfths) among the candidates presented by the regional parliaments;
two candidates are proposed by the Cabinet; and two are proposed by a majority of three-ﬁfths of
the General Council of Judicial Power [GCPJ] (Consejo General del Poder Judicial). The presi-
dent sets the agenda of the court and has the last word in the case of a tie. At least eight judges have
to be present on the court for a decision to be reached (LOTC, 1979).
An important difference separates Spain from France and Italy (Sala, 2010). Actually – just
as in Germany and Belgium – the access to the Constitutional Court is open to a wide range
of plaintiffs in Spain. Ordinary judges, the ombudsman, regional parliaments, the state legis-
latures (50 deputies or senators), central and regional governments, and even individuals
(through the amparo procedure) can initiate the constitutional review procedure. According
to Section 161.2 of the Constitution, regional acts are suspended ex lege, when challenged
by state’s government. The obligation to send a request (requerimento) before challenging a
state regulation is compulsory for regional governments and optional for the state government
in the cases of a conﬂict of powers and devolved issues (but not in the case of a complaint of
unconstitutionality).
There are two basic proceedings for centre–periphery litigations in Spain: the recursos de incon-
stitucionalidad (complaints of unconstitutionality) and the conﬂictos de competencias (conﬂicts of
competences). The former occurs when a regional or central administration challenges a law
because it believes that the act is not consistent with the rules established by the Constitution.
The latter happens when regional and central administrations contest the sharing of powers in
a given policy area. Theoretically, regional and central executives can be involved in other types
of litigation, such as the infrequent negative conﬂicts of competences (conﬂictos negativos de com-
petencias) or the prior review of constitutionality (control previo de constitucionalidad) that disap-
peared in 1985 (Fernández Farreres, 2005).2
An ordinary court for territorial issues?
The Constitutional Court was initially conceived by constitutionalists as the last step for regulat-
ing intergovernmental conﬂicts. Alternative institutions were supposed to prevent the rise of ter-
ritorial litigations through institutional arrangements. Nevertheless, since the beginning of
democracy, the Tribunal is used as an ordinary court of last resort for channelling centre–periphery
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tensions (Gordillo Pérez, 2007). The central position of the court in the ﬁeld of territorial govern-
ance relies on four related dynamics.
First, Agranoff and Ramos Gallarin (1997) showed that intergovernmental relations in Spain
were mostly vertical; that is, they principally focused on the central Cabinet and its regional
counterparts as the main actors of the territorial system. Consequently, ‘Horizontal relations
among regional governments are practically non-existent’ (interview with a top-level civil servant,
Madrid, October 2015). According to ArbósMarín, Colino, García Morales, and Parrado (2009),
this conﬁguration can be best explained by the lack of autonomy of Spanish regions in the ﬁeld of
transregional projects. Alternatively, other authors (de Pedro Bonet, 2011) stress the lack of pol-
itical will of regional executives.
Likewise, Spanish intergovernmental relations are also predominantly bilateral. Despite the
creation of sectorial conferences (conferencias sectoriales) in 1983 – and the conference of presidents
in 2004 – these meetings between central and regional ministers still lack a real power of decision-
making. Moreover, sectorial conferences are convened by the central state’s representatives and can
only adopt symbolic agreements with no binding effects. This explains the survival of a series of
two-sided administrative mechanisms, such as the bilateral conferences, especially when the col-
laborating tiers are governed by the same political party (León & Ferrín Pereira, 2011).
Intergovernmental relations in Spain also suffer from a lack of institutionalization (Aja &
Colino, 2014). The most visible aspect is the lack of a federal senate, as is found in Germany.
The current Spanish upper house (Senado) faces two limitations for channelling territorial inter-
ests. The ﬁrst problem is related to its composition, since the Senado mostly consists of represen-
tatives elected by the provinces (Castellà Andreu, 2006). Nevertheless, some senators are elected
instead by alternative constituencies such as autonomous cities (Ceuta and Melilla) and auton-
omous communities. The second main limitation is the absence of any real veto power, since
the Senado cannot block bills proposed by the Congress (Congreso) and Cabinet for more than
two months. For these reasons, the Congress has become the central forum for intergovernmental
negotiations between state- and region-wide parties (Harguindéguy, Coller, & Cole, 2017).
Lastly, according to several authors, the consolidation of the Constitutional Court in Spain
was favoured by the lacunae of the 1978 Constitution (Aragón Reyes, 1986; Fernández Farreres,
2005; García de Enterría, 1982). Given the complex bargaining between political forces after the
death of Franco, this text states general principles of territorial organization – and, more speciﬁ-
cally, a large number of competencies shared between the regions and the central state – but it also
leaves considerable room for interpretation to the political actors. Consequently, constitutional
judges are frequently asked to make certain legal aspects clear through their decisions (Aja,
1989). The initial ambiguity explains the relevance of the Constitutional Court in relation to
the whole process of decentralization in Spain, as will be demonstrated in the next section.
THE FORCED JUDICIALIZATION OF TERRITORIAL POLITICS
The regulation of intergovernmental conﬂicts
Judicialization has been deﬁned by Hirschl (2011, p. 121) as ‘the reliance on courts and judicial
means for addressing core moral predicaments, public policy questions, and political controver-
sies’. As such, the judicialization of territorial politics is not something speciﬁc to Spain; it also
affects other countries such as Colombia and Brazil (Ferreira do Vale, 2013), or the United States
(Somin, 2017).3
The central position of the Constitutional Court can be assessed from a quantitative viewpoint.
The MAP-LEXTER data set includes the complete litigation between autonomous communities
and the central government between 1980 and 2014 (N = 1624).4 The examination of this data set
demonstrates that the Constitutional Court has been a relevant player in the ﬁeld of territorial
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governance since the very beginning of the state of autonomies. Once again, it must be stressed
that the court is used as an ordinary mechanism of intergovernmental regulation.
First, it can be observed that autonomous communities adopted proactive behaviour, since they
litigated twice as many times as the central government (66.5% and 33.5%, respectively).5 The
data also show that the litigants tended to use the actions of unconstitutionality and the conﬂicts
of competences in equal proportion (51.5% and 48.5%, respectively). Nevertheless, only 65% of
the total litigations handled by the court produced a ruling. The remaining 35% were annulated
by the court or withdrawn by the plaintiffs (Table 1).
Second, it appears from the percentage of victories for each side that the court favours the cen-
tral state. From 1980 to 2014, the central state won 71.5% of its claims, while regional actors only
achieved victory in 59% of cases. However, these data hide a two-step evolution. As shown in
Figure 1, the Constitutional Court did not favour any litigant from 1980 to 2002, since the regions
and the central state won alternately. However, the court clearly ruled in favour of central minis-
tries from 2003 to 2014, and it can be observed that from 2004 to 2010 the central state won 100%
of its claims.
Third, the MAP-LEXTER data set puts to the fore the relevance of some policy areas of con-
tention for the autonomous communities, such as agriculture, the economy or industry. Actually,
the conﬂicts dealing with the division of ﬁscal incomes from gambling or the management of riv-
ers are frequent. As previously stated, shared competences such as ‘agriculture, food and environ-
ment’ or ‘economy and competitiveness’ cause a higher number of conﬂicts than ‘defence’ and
‘foreign affairs and cooperation’ which are entirely controlled by the central government. As
stressed by an academic expert interviewed in Madrid in October 2015: ‘the fuzzy sharing of com-
petences established by articles 148 and 149 in the 1978 Constitution favours this kind of opposi-
tion’ (Figure 2).
Table 1. Proﬁle of intergovernmental litigations, 1980–2014.
N %
Types Recursos 840 51.5
Conﬂictos 784 48.5
Total 1624 100
Plaintiffsa Central state 542 33.5
Autonomous communities 1082 66.5
Total 1624 100
Resolutions Accepted or resolved 1051 65
Withdrawn or rejected 573 35
Total 1624 100
Litigationsb Won by the central state (out of the total state litigations) 231 71.5
Filed by the central state and resolved by the court 323 100
Won by autonomous communities (out of the total state litigations) 430 59
Filed by autonomous communities and resolved by the court 728 100
Total of won litigations (state plus autonomous communities) 661 62.9
Total ﬁled litigations and resolved by the court 1051 100
Notes: aThis item comprises the main plaintiff leading a complaint.
bThis item comprises the whole court’s decisions in which central and regional government are involved as single or joint
plaintiffs.
Sources: MINHAP (2015) and authors’ own elaboration.
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Fourth, the data show that intergovernmental conﬂicts followed a cyclical dynamic between
1980 and 2014. Obviously, those cycles of contention are difﬁcult to synthesize because of the var-
ious issues tackled by the Constitutional Court. Nevertheless, certain trends can be observed (Ara-
gón Reyes, 2006). According to one of the interviewed justices (Barcelona, November 2015): ‘the
ﬁrst period (1980–91) corresponds to the launching of the state of autonomies. Regional govern-
ments had to ﬁnd their place in this brand new territorial model. This caused several conﬂicts’.
Later: ‘The adoption of the Second Autonomous Pacts in 1992 softened the situation temporarily,
but the alternation of majorities produced new conﬂicts of competences during the second part
because of the renegotiation of autonomous statutes (1992–2008).’ Finally: ‘the budgetary cuts
and the absolute majority of Conservatives left no choice to the regional governments who decided
to defend their self-competences before the Constitutional Court’ (Figure 3).
Last, the MAP-LEXTER data set reveals that the levels of intergovernmental contention dif-
fered greatly from one region to the other. At the top of the ranking, Catalonia accumulates 33.2%
Figure 1. Evolution of won litigations (%), 1980–2014.
Source: MINHAP (2015).
Figure 2. Ranking of intergovernmental conﬂicts by policy sectors, 1980–2014.
Source: MINHAP (2015).
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of all litigations, followed by a group of front runners constituted by the Basque Country (16.9%),
Galicia (7.9%) and Andalusia (7.7%).6 The rest of the regions represent between 0.8% and 5.4% of
the total challenges. To put it another way, the autonomous communities ruled by article 151 (i.e.,
those that beneﬁtted from an advanced statute of autonomy before the others) are more conﬂictive
than the rest (Table 2).
Figure 3. Evolution of intergovernmental conﬂicts, 1980–2014.
Source: MINHAP (2015).
Table 2. Ranking of intergovernmental conﬂicts by regions, 1980–2014.
Total number of
conﬂicts
Percentage of conﬂicts
of the total
Annual
average
Catalonia 539 33.2 15.9
Basque Country 275 16.9 8.1
Galicia 129 7.9 3.8
Andalusia 125 7.7 3.7
Canary Islands 88 5.4 2.6
Aragon 70 4.3 2.1
Navarre 57 3.5 1.7
Castilla-La Mancha 50 3.1 1.5
Balears 49 3 1.4
Valencia 47 2.9 1.4
Extremadura 45 2.8 1.3
Asturias 35 2.2 1
Madrid 31 1.9 0.9
Cantabria 30 1.8 0.9
Castille and Leon 27 1.7 0.8
Rioja 14 0.9 0.4
Murcia 13 0.8 0.4
Total 1624 100 47.8
Source: MINHAP (2015).
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Shaping territorial issues through the constitutional review
Beyond the quantitative perspective, the Spanish territorial system has been profoundly shaped by
the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court. In 1978, the complex process of the adoption of the
Constitution allowed a text to be produced with solid statements (e.g., articles about political and
civil liberties) along with vague principles (e.g., those dealing with the federal organization of the
state). Consequently, the court has been frequently asked to clarify some aspects of the Consti-
tution. Though it is impossible to summarize the whole constitutional jurisprudence in territorial
politics, it is important to stress the main areas of contention that have caught the attention of
justices (Tribunal Constitucional, 2016).
First, the court made an effort to clarify the Spanish legal order with respect to regional legis-
lation. Indeed, it afﬁrmed that regional autonomy and sovereignty were two different concepts
(ruling 4/1981). It also proclaimed the unity of the legal order (ruling 4/1982) and that regional
autonomy was political, not administrative (ruling 25/1985). Therefore, Spanish autonomous
communities’ historical rights were guaranteed within the framework of the 1978 Constitution
(ruling 76/1988). By the same token, the court insisted on the constitutional exigence of solidarity
and loyalty between territorial actors (ruling 64/1990) (Aragón Reyes, 2006).
Second, the prevalence of state legislation was then counterbalanced by the fundamental ruling
on the Ley Orgánica de Armonización del Proceso Autonómico (LOAPA, or Organic Law for Har-
monizing the Autonomous Process). In 1981, the Union of the Democratic Centre, along with
the Socialist Party, signed the ﬁrst pact of autonomy and aimed to re-equilibrate the competences
between Spanish regions. That decision was contested by the Basque and Catalan governments,
who defended their right to establish their own regional legal orders. Through ruling 76/1983, the
constitutional justices ﬁnally forbade the central legislative from modifying the sharing of power
established by the Constitution and the regional statutes of autonomy (since both constitute the
so-called ‘bloc of constitutionality’) through a simple law. By doing so, this ruling preserved the
distinction between constituted and constituent powers and guaranteed autonomy to the regions
(reafﬁrmed by ruling 137/1986) (Fernández Farreres, 2005).
Third, the sharing of policy areas between central and regional administrations has been
more complicated to deﬁne because of the vague division established by the Constitution.
According to the court, the central state does not have a monopoly on shared competences;
it has, rather, the role of policy-framer (ruling 173/1998). More than a strict relationship of
prevalence, state institutions are supposed to collaborate with autonomous communities in
order to ensure the good operation of public services (ruling 81/1997). One of the last develop-
ments in this ﬁeld has been the reactivation of the debate about the legitimacy of the central
government imposing European regulations concerning budget stability on autonomous com-
munities after the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis. Though the court recognized the autonomy of regions
in their own areas of competence vis-à-vis the European legislation (ruling 252/1988), it also
gave the power to the central government to check the compliance of those norms (ruling
252/1988). This statement had been put forth previously in 2001 (ruling 62/2001) to guarantee
the budgetary equilibrium of public accounts and had been reafﬁrmed in 2011 (ruling 134/2011)
(de la Quadra-Salcedo Janini, 2013).
The Catalan bone of contention
One of the most famous aspects of the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court has been the set
of decisions dealing with the right to self-determination of minorities. Despite the Catalan case
that has recently occupied the attention of the media, the ﬁrst antecedent was the Ibarretxe
Plan (Propuesta de Estatuto Político de la Comunidad de Euskadi). In 2003, the Basque Parliament
adopted a bill in order to convert the Basque Country into an associated state of Spain. After a
series of harsh discussions with the Constitutional Court, the Basque regional law 9/2008 was
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adopted to organize a referendum on the implementation of the plan. This project was immedi-
ately blocked by the constitutional judges through ruling 103/2008. The ﬁrst ground in the Con-
stitutional Court’s ruling was that the so-called consulta was in reality a referendum, even though it
was not called by that name, and that, under the Spanish system, the only referendums that are
possible are those expressly established in the Constitution. Moreover, the court argued that, in
addition, regional referendums needed to be authorized by the central government, according
to article 149.1.32 of the Constitution (Aguado Renedo, 2011).
After this episode, the centre–periphery tensions moved to Catalonia.7 In September 2005, the
party coalition that led the Catalan government (Generalitat) proposed to modify the 1979 statute
adopted during the transition to democracy. After an internal debate between the three partners
leading the Catalan executive (Party of Socialists of Catalonia, or Partit del Socialistes de Catalunya;
Republican Left of Catalonia, or Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya; and Initiative for Catalonia,
or Iniciativa per Catalunya), a ﬁrst draft was sent to the Spanish Cortes (Parliament) in November
2005. The Congress and the Senate – both controlled by the PSOE (Partido Socialista Obrero
Español, or Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party) – ratiﬁed the new draft. The statute was ﬁnally
approved through a referendum by 74% of Catalan voters (with a voter turnout of 49.41%) on
18 June 2006 (Keating & Wilson, 2009).
Nevertheless, on 31 July the PP (Partido Popular, or People’s Party) challenged 128 of the 233
statute’s articles before the Constitutional Court (case 8045-2006). This litigation was followed by
six additional petitions formulated by the ombudsman and six regional governments (Aragon,
Balears, Valencian Community, Murcia and La Rioja). After four years of controversies, the
court published its decision on 28 June 2010 (ruling 31/2010). The constitutional justices accepted
most of the original proposal, but 14 articles were declared unconstitutional and 23 articles and
four provisions were reinterpreted. Those articles dealt with the concept of the Catalan nation,
the ﬁscal relationship between Catalonia and Spain, the status of the Catalan language, and
the nature of Spanish quasi-federalism. As expected, this decision was highly controversial,
since the Constitutional Court was asked to set the limits of the decentralization policy
(Colino, 2009).
Meanwhile, a mass demonstration was organized on 11 September 2012 by the Catalan
National Assembly, a nationalist association promoting the independence of the region and its
conversion into a new European state. A fortnight later, on 25 September, the president of the
Generalitat called early regional elections, and on 27 September the main nationalist parties of
Catalonia agreed to organize a referendum on self-determination. Convergència i Unió (Conver-
gence and Union) and Esquerra Republicana, the main nationalist forces in parliament, won a
majority in the Catalan government on 25 November and signed an agreement to organize a
future consultation about the political future of Catalonia.
On 23 January 2013, the Catalan Parliament adopted a Declaration of Sovereignty and the
Right to Decide (Declaración de soberanía y del derecho a decidir). This declaration was immediately
suspended and declared void, but the court stated that the ‘right to decide’ should be resolved pol-
itically by amending the Constitution (ruling 42/2014). On 27 September 2014, the Catalan gov-
ernment adopted a decree for organizing an Alternative Consultation (consulta alternative), since
the concept of referendum was deﬁnitely banned for legal reasons. This consultation was sus-
pended by the Constitutional Court on 13 October.
However, the Catalan government responded by planning another poll (now titled Proceso par-
ticipativo sobre el futuro político de Cataluña, or Participative Process on the Political Future of Cat-
alonia) on 9 November 2014. Once again, the court halted the procedure. On 11 June 2015, the
whole Participative Process was declared unconstitutional by the court (ruling 31/2015) (Solozábal
Echavarría, 2015). As will be stressed in the next section, those last constitutional developments in
Catalonia constituted a breaking point for the Constitutional Court in terms of politicization and
legitimacy.
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TERRITORIAL POLITICS AS A SOURCE OF POLITICIZATION
From party selection to institutional blockage
According to Hein and Ewert’s (2014, p. 38) deﬁnition, the term ‘politicization’ exclusively
denotes ‘direct and indirect inﬂuences on constitutional court decisions (i.e. the court in general,
the trials, the judges, and the decision-making process)’. The scientiﬁc literature has demonstrated
on several occasions that the politicization of constitutional courts was inevitable, and that the
Spanish case was all but an exception (Miley, 2008). Although article 159.5 of the Constitution
states that the ‘members of the Constitutional Court must be independent’, and article 22 of the
LOCT afﬁrms that constitutional judges should respect the principles of ‘impartiality and dignity’,
control of the Constitutional Court represents a crucial issue for the political parties since they
want to prevent their own policies from being vetoed.
As noted above, the selection of constitutional justices depends on four institutions: the Cabi-
net, the Congress, the Senate and the GCPJ. As in other countries, such as France, Germany or
Italy, this rule logically supposes a certain level of control by the political parties over the compo-
sition of the court. The presence of the PP and the PSOE is particularly visible through their par-
liamentary majorities in the Parliament and the Cabinet. But the politicization of the GCPJ is also
perceptible through ‘the afﬁliation of its members to the main associations of justices: the pro-
gressive Jueces para la Democracia, the conservative Asociación Profesional de la Magistratura and
the more neutral Asociación Francisco de Vitoria’ (interview with a top-level civil servant, Madrid,
October 2015).
Although the PP and the PSOE control the process of selection of constitutional justices, Bas-
que and Catalan nationalist parties have had their say at certain points. The Basque Nationalist
Party (Partido Nacionalista Vasco) and the Catalan nationalists of Convergència i Unió have some-
times participated in the choice of the justices appointed by the Congress (in 1992, 2010 or 2012,
for instance, and always in collaboration with the PSOE). Moreover, the 2007 organic law modi-
ﬁed the process of appointment of constitutional justices by the Senate. It allowed regional parlia-
ments to propose two candidates each to the upper chamber (Sánchez Barrlao, 2009).
Conservatives and progressives have run the court for 15 years each (Table 3) with variable
degrees of politicization. For the ﬁrst 30 years, pressure from political parties shaped the contours
of Spanish constitutional justice without blocking its normal operations. Indeed, from 1980 to
1985, the Constitutional Court was controlled by a majority of conservative justices appointed
by the Unión del Centro Democrático (Adolfo Suárez’s political party). In 1986, the PSOE of Felipe
González imposed the presence of progressive judges until 2000. In 2000, new appointments
made by the PP Cabinet gave the majority to the conservatives until 2008.8 The degree of poli-
ticization increased dramatically during the second period (2008–14) when the opposition
between the PP and the PSOE led to the paralysis of the court’s activity until 2012, and then
to a new conservative majority from 2012 to 2014. The politicization of the court with respect
to the ruling about the statute of Catalonia damaged the reputation for impartiality of the
court, as we will demonstrate below.
The Catalan statute and the delaying strategy
To a large extent, centre–periphery conﬂicts brought to the fore the connections between consti-
tutional justice and political parties.9 From that perspective, the ruling on the 2006 statute of
autonomy of Catalonia can be considered as a critical juncture in the history of the court. Like
the rest of the Spanish autonomous communities, Catalonia is ruled by a speciﬁc statute that regu-
lates its own political institutions along with its relationship to the Spanish central government. In
2006, the complaint of unconstitutionality adopted by the PP against the Catalan statute insti-
gated an open crisis among the constitutional justices.
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Table 3. Historical composition of the Spanish Constitutional Court, 1980–2014.
Year Appointer
Days of delay in
the appointment
Justices
appointed by
progressive
partiesa
Justices appointed
by conservative
parties
Justices
appointed by
consensus
Majority at
the court
Spanish
Cabinet
President of
the court
1980 Congress,
government and
GCPJ
0 4 8 0 Conservative Conservativeb M. García Pelayo
1981 4 8 0 Conservative Conservative
1982 4 8 0 Conservative Conservative
1983 Congress 77 3 9 0 Conservative Progressive
1984 3 9 0 Conservative Progressive
1985 3 9 0 Conservative Progressive
1986 Government and
GCPJ
0 8 4 0 Progressive Progressive F. Tomás y
Valiente1987 8 4 0 Progressive Progressive
1988 8 4 0 Progressive Progressive
1989 Senate 0 9 3 0 Progressive Progressive
1990 9 3 0 Progressive Progressive
1991 9 3 0 Progressive Progressive
1992 Congress 0 10 1 1 Progressive Progressive M. Rodríguez-
Piñero Bravo-
Ferrer
1993 10 1 1 Progressive Progressive
1994 10 1 1 Progressive Progressive
(Continued )
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Table 3. Continued.
Year Appointer
Days of delay in
the appointment
Justices
appointed by
progressive
partiesa
Justices appointed
by conservative
parties
Justices
appointed by
consensus
Majority at
the court
Spanish
Cabinet
President of
the court
1995 Government and
GCPJ
45 9 2 1 Progressive Progressive A. Rodríguez
Bereijo1996 9 1 2 Progressive Conservative
1997 9 1 2 Progressive Conservative
1998 Senate 293 6 4 2 Progressive Conservative
1999 6 4 2 Progressive Conservative P. Cruz Villalón
2000 6 4 2 Progressive Conservative
2001 Congress 194 4 6 2 Conservative Conservative
2002 4 6 2 Conservative Conservative M. Jiménez de
Parga2003 4 6 2 Conservative Conservative
2004 Government and
GCPJ
62 5 6 1 Conservative Progressive
2005 5 6 1 Conservative Progressive M. E. Casas
Baamonde2006 5 6 1 Conservative Progressive
2007 Senate 1120 5 6 1 Conservative Progressive
2008 5 5 1 Tie Progressive
2009 5 5 1 Tie Progressive
2010 Congress 619 5 5 1 Tie Progressive
2011 6 6 1 Tie Progressive P. Sala Sánchez
2012 7 7 0 Tie Conservative
2013 Government and
GCPJ
7 5 7 0 Conservative Conservative
2014 5 7 0 Conservative Conservative F. Pérez de los
Cobos Orihuel
GCPJ, General Council of Judicial Power.
Notes: aDepends on the proposal by the People’s Party (Partido Popular – PP) and the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (Partido Socialista Obrero Español – PSOE) through the Congress, the
Senate and the Cabinet.
bDepends on the timing of appointment, during the ﬁrst or the last six months of the year.
Sources: Sánchez Cuenca (2011) and authors’ own elaboration.
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Two territorial conceptions clashed. On the one hand, the PP aimed to limit the self-govern-
ing capacity of the regions in the name of the unity of the Spanish nation. Moreover, after its elec-
toral defeat of 2004, the PP did not want to lose its grip on the Constitutional Court – the last
vestige of conservative representation within the state’s institutions. On the other hand, the
PSOE accepted the aspirations of the Catalan government within the limits of the 1978 Consti-
tution, because of the crucial importance of Catalan voters in supporting the socialist majority in
the Congress. These political tensions became clearly visible through the delays in appointing con-
stitutional judges and the ‘war of recusals’ between ideological blocks.
With respect to the delays, from 2007 to 2012, the PP and the PSOE proved unable to reach
any agreement about the candidates for the Constitutional Court. In December 2007, the man-
date of four constitutional judges was up, but the PP and the PSOE’s senators mutually blocked
the candidatures of the four new aspirants. The four outgoing justices divided into three conser-
vative and one progressive judges and the PSOE could have appointed two progressive judges
leading to a progressive majority at the court. The PP refused those nominations for three
years but the senators ﬁnally reached a consensus in the autumn of 2010 (after the death of
judge García Calvo on 18 May 2008, which re-established the tie between conservatives and pro-
gressives). At the same time, the Congress had to appoint three other judges whose mandate
would be up in November 2010. Despite the prohibition of article 159.3 of the Constitution,
two-thirds of the court would have been replaced at once.
In September 2010, the PP and PSOE members of the Congress (along with the Catalan
nationalist party Convergence and Union) found an arrangement for appointing four new justices.
They also introduced an amendment to shorten the mandate of one-third of the judges in order to
avoid the overlapping of replacements in the future. However, the agreement failed in the end.
During her farewell ceremony, the President of the Constitutional Court, María Emilia Casas
Baamonde, spoke in harsh terms against the politicization of the court by stressing ‘a serious
unfulﬁlment of the Constitution [that is] detrimental to Spanish democracy’. In the summer of
2010, the outgoing justices were ﬁnally replaced by two progressive and two conservative candi-
dates by the Congress, after a struggle that had lasted for a year and a half.
The recusals’ war
The political struggle between the PP and the PSOE for control over the Constitutional Court
also took on other forms through the so-called ‘recusals’ war’ (Lázaro, 2008). From 2006 to
2010, political parties aimed to inﬂuence the composition of the court in order to promote
their own visions of Spain. It is worth noting that in 2006, the court faced the particular situation
of there being an ideological tie, with six conservative judges and six progressive judges with
respect to territorial politics. However, the progressive proﬁle of the president, Baamonde, gave
an advantage to the pro-Catalan statute bloc.
In Spain, the legal bases for disqualifying a constitutional judge are almost the same as for
ordinary judges and are regulated by article 219 of the organic law 6/1985. Nevertheless, given
the speciﬁc nature of the Constitutional Court, the recusal of its justices must be decided in
the last instance by the court itself. The PP aimed to neutralize progressive justices in order to
veto the Catalan statute reform, while the PSOE and Catalan parties tried to disqualify the judges
with a conservative proﬁle for avoiding such a blockage. As stressed by a public law specialist inter-
viewed in Barcelona in November 2015: ‘The objective was the disqualiﬁcation of constitutional
justices and/or their mere abstention during the preliminary process of examination, since the
affected judges cannot participate in the debate about their own recusation.’
The struggle started on 2 November 2005: the PP intended to recuse judge Pablo Pérez
Tremps, but the Constitutional Court dismissed this request. The pro-Catalan statute forces
counterattacked on 11 October 2006, when the Catalan Cabinet and the Catalan Parliament
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tried to disqualify judge Roberto García-Calvo y Montiel for his involvement in a previous judge-
ment against the Catalan government. This recusation was also rejected by the court.
On 2 November 2006, the PP parliamentary group aimed to recuse the president of the Con-
stitutional Court, Baamonde. The PP deputies argued that her husband (Jesús Leguina Villa, pro-
fessor of public law) had previously published a series of articles dealing with the reform of the
Catalan statute. Those claims were dismissed by the court. However, on 5 February 2007, the
Constitutional Court ﬁnally accepted the new request of the PP deputies against Tremps.
The plaintiffs argued that this justice (formerly a professor of public law) was not impartial
since he had previously written a chapter in a book about the reform of the Catalan statute
published by the Catalan Institut d’Estudis Autonómics. Given the presence of some of Tremps’
arguments in the report sent by the Institut to the Catalan Parliament, the Constitutional Court
ﬁnally accepted this motion for disqualiﬁcation (with ﬁve dissenting votes). The tie was broken in
favour of the conservatives (six against ﬁve).
On 7 March 2007, the Catalan government requested judge Jorge Rodríguez-Zapata Pérez be
recused. According to the claimant, this judge had previously written a report for the academic
organization Fundación Carles Pi i Sunyer where he tackled some points of future reform. Never-
theless, the court unanimously decided to reject the petition. In turn, on 19 October 2007, the
Spanish government, led by the PSOE, solicited the recusals of García-Calvo y Montiel and
Rodríguez-Zapata Pérez for their criticisms of the reform of the LOTC. The court held that
those judges were not impartial and the recusals were accepted. The new balance of power
favoured the interests of the progressive justices (ﬁve against four). The PP members of the Con-
gress followed the same strategy on 26 October 2007 by negating the impartiality of Pascual Sala
Sánchez, Tremps and Manuel Aragón, for expressing their opinions about the reform in a pro-
fessional meeting. Despite the rejection of the recusation, the remaining constitutional justices
recognized that the acceptance of this challenge would have paralyzed the court because of the
lack of a legal quorum of eight judges.
One might think that this series of disqualiﬁcations was only an isolated episode linked to the
reform of the statute of Catalonia. Nevertheless, this process is not over and it should be con-
sidered to be part of the current political relationship between the centre and the peripheries in
Spain. In the words of one of the Catalan senators interviewed in October 2015 in Madrid:
‘the Pandora’s box is open’. Indeed, in 2013, the revelation of the afﬁliation of the former president
of the court – Francisco Pérez de los Cobos – with the PP between 1996 and 2007 provoked a
certain malaise in public opinion. The Parliament of Catalonia used this information to have
him recused.
However, while article 159.4 of the Constitution forbids constitutional justices from exerting
‘managerial functions in a political party or labour union […]’, Pérez de los Cobos argued that his
status as a former simple militant was not incompatible with his position as a judge (Fabra, 2013).
More recently, in October 2014, Catalan deputies sought to have recused at least three consti-
tutional judges (Pérez de los Cobos, Pedro González-Trevijano and Enrique López) for previously
having expressed a negative opinion about law 10/2014 adopted by the Catalan Parliament.10 The
complaint was rejected, but it shows how the political parties intend to use the institutional weak-
nesses of the court for their own purposes (Matia Portilla, 2014).11
CONCLUSIONS
This study has focused on the role of the Spanish Constitutional Court in the state of autonomies
from 1980 to 2014. The dynamic of decentralization in Spain provoked the rise of two main tiers
of power: central and regional governments. This particular design favoured the consolidation of a
federal-like constitutional court: the Tribunal Constitucional. Taking those structural elements into
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consideration, this paper analyzed the two sides of the nexus between constitutional justice and the
state of autonomies. As stated in the introduction, it was hypothesized that the judicialization and
politicization dynamics – present in all federations’ supreme courts – went so far in Spain that they
led to the blockage of the Constitutional Court.
On the one hand, this investigation demonstrated that the vague principles deﬁned by the
1978 Constitution needed to be redeﬁned by the justices. This is why the Constitutional Court
profoundly shaped the contours of the devolution process in Spain through a dynamic of ‘judi-
cialization’ of territorial politics. The analysis of the volume of litigations handled by the con-
stitutional justices shows the relevance of this institution in managing regional conﬂicts since
its inception. The study particularly emphasized the pivotal role of the court in managing the
tensions between Catalonia and the central government in the ﬁeld of shared competences
between central and regional executives (such as agriculture, economy or tourism). The exam-
ination of the judicial review of the court then put to the fore its role in structuring the devel-
opment of the state of autonomies (through the LOAPA case and the statute of Catalonia
ruling, for instance).
On the other hand, this research aimed to investigate the other side of the coin, that is, the
series of pressures exerted by territorial actors on the Constitutional Court. Of course, the politi-
cization of constitutional justice is not a speciﬁcally Spanish phenomenon. However, in Spain, this
dynamic led to the quasi-paralysis of the Constitutional Court from 2008 to 2012. This insti-
tutional crisis had to do with the judgement handed down concerning the reform of the Catalan
statute (2006–10). The verdict of the court was going to inﬂuence deeply the future development
of the state of autonomies, and political parties did their best to break the tie between the conser-
vative and progressive constitutional judges. During that period, the PP and the PSOE (along
with Catalan parties) tried to delay the appointment procedure of justices in the Senate and the
Congress. Additionally, political parties started to challenge the impartiality of constitutional jus-
tices through the so-called ‘war of recusations’.
Therefore, how does one deﬁne the role played by the court in territorial politics? Since the
1990s, many scholars have sought to understand the evolution of constitutional justice within a
single theoretical framework. One of the dominant schools of thought since the 1990s – the ‘prin-
cipal-agent’ approach of delegation – deﬁned non-majoritarian institutions (such as international
organizations or national regulatory agencies) as actors exercising a public authority without having
been elected by the people (Epstein & O’Halloran, 1999). This means those ‘agents’ realize their
functions under the indirect orders of their ‘principals’. Nevertheless, in accordance with Stone
Sweet (2002), we assume that the case of the Spanish Constitutional Court is slightly different,
since the principle of separation of powers theoretically guarantees the independence of the judiciary
vis-à-vis the executive and legislative branches. Drawing on the work of Majone (2001), Stone
Sweet (2002, p. 77) prefers to describe this role as: ‘[a] model of trusteeship in which “relational
contracting” and “imperfect commitment” lead political rulers to delegate broad “ﬁduciary” powers
to a particular kind of agent – a trustee – and then to guarantee that trustee’s independence’.
To conclude, the study of the role of the Tribunal Constitucional in territorial politics – now
understood as a trustee – is of great interest for understanding the contemporary dynamics of
the Spanish state of autonomies. As shown previously, the court’s decisions do not completely
depend on party preferences and its politicization has more to do with external forces than
with the aim of its members. As demonstrated by the running battles concerning the statute of
Catalonia, the Tribunal Constitucional has been used by political forces as a way to transform pol-
itical issues into judicial issues (and delaying or vetoing the decisions of the opposition) (De
Miguel Barcena, 2012). The Constitutional Court aspires (or should aspire) to remain a judicial
arbiter, but political actors constantly force it to take sides. This evolution demonstrates – once
again – the need to reform the mechanisms of intergovernmental relations in Spain in order to
provide alternative political arenas of negotiation to political forces.
Between justice and politics: the role of the Spanish Constitutional Court in the state of autonomies 15
TERRITORY, POLITICS, GOVERNANCE
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The authors are grateful to the Spanish Ministry of Public Administration, Jesús Ramos Prieto,
César Colino, Salvador Parrado, Sandra León, José Álvarez Junco, Lourdes Nieto, Robert Agran-
off, Joan Subirats, Jaume López, Eliseo Aja, Luis Moreno, Xavier Arbós and Ferrán Martínez i
Coma for their support and helpful comments.
DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
No potential conﬂict of interest was reported by the authors.
FUNDING
This work was supported by the BBVA Foundation (Ayudas 2014 a Investigadores, Innovadores y
Creadores) and Pablo de Olavide University (Ayudas del Plan Propio a Líneas Emergentes 2014)
as part of the project ‘ITT-Spain, indicador de tensiones territoriales (1978–2014)’.
NOTES
1. A Tribunal de Garantías Constitucionales (Court for Constitutional Guarantees) was created in September
1933 under the Second Republic (Bassols Coma, 2010).
2. This type of action was re-established in 2015, although only with regard to Statutes of Autonomy or Territory
Acts and no longer with regard to Organic Laws.
3. The political role of the Constitutional Court became particularly evident when the former president of the
court, Francisco Tomás y Valiente, was murdered by the Basque terrorist group ETA (Euskadi ta Askatasuna,
meaning Basque Country and Freedom) on 14 February 1996.
4. MAP-LEXTER is produced by theMINHAP, the Constitutional Court and the Boletín Oﬁcial del Estado (the
equivalent of the British Hansard).
5. There are two basic judicial proceedings for centre–periphery litigations in Spain: the recursos de inconstitucio-
nalidad (complaints of unconstitutionality) and the conﬂictos de competencias (conﬂicts of competences). The former
occurs when a regional or central administration challenges a law because it believes that the act is not consistent
with the principles of the Constitution. The latter happens when regional and central administrations contest the
sharing of power in a given policy area. Theoretically, regional and central executives can be involved in other types
of litigation, such as the infrequent negative conﬂicts of competences (conﬂictos negativos de competencias) or the prior
review of constitutionality (control previo de constitucionalidad) that ended in 1985 (Fernández Farreres, 2005).
6. A former Basque senator interviewed in Seville (February 2016) added that the Basque executive stopped chal-
lenging all the regulations adopted by central government in 1991: ‘we understood that the Constitutional Court
was a simple third chamber controlled by the PP and the PSOE. This is why we decided to adopt a more selective
judicial strategy’.
7. With the exceptions of the Basque and Catalan statutes, the wave of reform of regional statutes in 2000 did not
provoke any crises in Aragon, Cantabria, Castilla-La Mancha, Balears, Murcia, Madrid, Estremadura and Navarre.
Such statutory reforms were necessary to adapt the legal frameworks of these regions after 25 years of decentraliza-
tion (Casanas Adam, 2017).
8. In 2004, Premier Aznar decided to wait until after the general elections to appoint new conservative judges.
Nevertheless, the PSOE ﬁnally won the elections and reduced the gap between conservative and progressive justices
by appointing two new progressive members.
9. Actually, certain previous events had marked the increasing politicization of the Constitutional Court. For
instance, in 1998, the Senate took nine months to reach agreement on appointing its candidates to the court.
As another example, in 2003, the president of the court, Manuel Jiménez de Parga, surprised the Spanish political
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milieu with a statement denying the existence of ‘historical nationalities’ (namely, the Basque and Catalan commu-
nities). This discourse contrasted with the traditional discretion of the previous presidents of the court. To a certain
extent, this evolution has been analyzed as a side effect of the progressive polarization of the Spanish political system
(Gunther & Montero, 2012).
10. The case of López is a good illustration of the interaction between justice and politics. Between 2007 and
2013, this judge was repeatedly proposed by the PP as a candidate for the Constitutional Court. In 2013, the Con-
servative government ﬁnally appointed López, but the new court judge remained under ﬁre from the other political
parties, who criticized his participation in some 50 events organized by the PP’s Fundación para el Análisis y los
Estudios Sociales.
11. Interestingly, the Gabinet d’Estudis Socials i Opinió Pública (GESOP) demonstrated in 2010 that 63.8% of
Spanish citizens considered the tribunal was not an independent institution vis-à-vis political parties. In Catalonia,
this percentage arose to 70% (GESOP, 2010).
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